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"Law is the perfection of human- reason"
VOL VII JANUARY, 1932 NO. 2
FATUOUS CROSS-EXAMINATION
It is not at all uncommon to hear the expression at the
bar as well as among the laity: "That case was won by the
cross-examination." The observation is frequently correct,
but the laity and novitiate assume too much the positive,
instead of the negative of the declaration-understand it
to mean that skillful cross-examination proved the bete noir
of the vanquished side. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say
that a third of the bitterly contested cases dependent on
facts, as distinct from questions of law, are won by the side
whose witnesses have been over-cross-examined, or ineptly
cross-examined. A famous trial lawyer was known to spend
very little pre-trial time with his witnesses touching the evi-
dence they would give on direct examination, but devoted
a great deal to preparing them for the cross-examination.
It is purposed here to point out, by example and admo-
nition, some of the innumerable pit-falls the inexperienced
cross-examiner is faced with in the trial of a cause, with the
hope that some of them may be avoided.
Doubtless one of the most prevalent phenomena of mala-
droitness found at the trial bar is the almost universal be-
lief by the novitiate that he must cross-examine every wit-
ness the other side presents. Especially damning is this
belief when the cause is tried to a jury. The psychological
effect (detrimental to the cross-examiner's side) on the un-
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trained jury of an unsuccessful cross-examination-a verbal
scrutiny of the testimony which leaves the evidence given
wholly unshaken and perhaps fortified-is too often under-
estimated. Prolific examples are cases where a witness is
testifying to something formal that is not at all disputed.
A replevin trial comes to mind where the cause was irretriev-
ably lost (vouched for by the jury) because of a half hour's
barrage of irritating and scornful cross-examination by
counsel for the defendant. The plaintiff's witness, a de-
mure young lady of some charm, testified to naught but that
she, on behalf of the plaintiff, before action commenced,
made demand upon the defendant for the res in action.
There Was no dispute, although not formally conceded, but
that a demand had been made. In fact the circumstances
of the case ' were such that a demand was not essential, but
the plaintiff put it into evidence on the theory abundans
cautela non nocet. To more potently demonstrate the fa-
tuity of the cross-examination, we give a portion of it in
haec verba:
"Q. Are you certain that the defendant, when you saw
him on that evening, wore a lumber-jack?
A. I would not be positive, that is my best recollection.
I did not take particular note.
Q. He may have been wearing an ordinary shirt-a cot-
ton shirt?
A. I may have been mistaken.
Q. What color was it?
A. I would not be prepared to swear as to its color.
I think it was blue.
Q. You think it was: young lady, you are under oath
to tell the truth, not to speculate. Will you say it
was blue?
A. I am not certain.
I Jordan v. Jordan, 136 N. E. 866 (Ind. 1922)
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Q. Then why do you undertake to tell this jury, when
you are under oath, that it was blue, when you are
not certain?
A. I did not intend to tell them, positively.
Q. Perhaps you did not intend to tell them positively
that you demanded the return of this ring? (The
subject-matter of the suit.)
A. Yes, of that I am certain.
Q. How certain?
A. As certain as I can be of anything.
Q. As certain as you can be that the defendant at the
time wore a blue lumber-jack.
A. I am not certain about that.
Q. Then why did you swear to it?
A. I did not swear to that for sure.
Q. How is the jury to know what you are swearing to
for sure, and what you are swearing to on mere
guess?
A. A§ to asking Mr. Lindrum for the ring, of that I
am sure.
Q. As sure as you are that Mr. Lindrum on the evening
in question wore a blue lumber-jack?"
And so on, ad infinitum. The sarcasm, taunt, and dis-
paragement, implicit in the voice and mannerisms of the
cross-examiner, cannot be illustrated. Of course, the wit-
ness remained unshaken on the only topic touching which
she was called. The defendant, when he took the stand,
did not deny that demand was made upon him by the wit-
ness. He was not asked concerning his sartorial invest-
ment on the evening in question, nor the color of his shirt
or lumber-jack. The only important question in the case,
hotly disputed, was whether the plaintiff, seller of a diamond
ring on the installment plan under a conditional sales con-
tract, had or had not granted defendant, the purchaser,
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three month's extension of time to make a payment, past
due at the time of demand, which, if sustained, would have
carried it beyond the time of institution of suit. The nat-
ural ensemble of the case was such as to bode ill for the
plaintiff. If there could be any illegitimate sympathy in-
fluentially operative-and in such cases there usually is-
the defendant had it all his way. But for the unfortunate
trend of the cross-examination, which in its last phases
clearly indicated a determination on the part of the cross-
examiner to cast aspersions upon the witness's moral
character, but from which effort she came unscathed, the
plaintiff would have unquestionably obtained the verdict.
The unsuccessful attempt to cast suspicion on the witness's
testimony aroused the ire and disgust of the jury. From
that point onward, the verdict belonged to the plaintiff. The
shrewdness of counsel for the plaintiff was also here shown.
Notwithstanding numerous objections could have been suc-
cessfully directed to many irrelevant and assumptive ques-
tions asked, plaintiff's counsel sat by silent and unperturbed,
heartily enjoying the seance. He knew every question and
answer was costing his opponent dearly.
The most dangerous witness on cross-examination is the
"loaded" witness. Women predominate in this category.
The term is employed to designate a witness who, on the
slightest opening given on cross-examination, will "fire"
damaging but incompetent testimony in favor of the side
for which the witness is called. It is the fashion, though
perhaps of questionable ethics, for counsel of that side to
"prime the load" beforehand to encourage, or even suggest,
that the witness "fire" when the cross-examiner "pulls the
trigger." It may not be amiss to resort to another verbatim
illustration:
In a contest over the validity of a will of a testatrix, who
was unquestionably insane at the time of her death, one
of the defendants was on the stand. Her competency to
testify was limited to the question of the mental capacity
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of the testatrix upon which the witness was permitted to
give an opinion. Only such facts and transactions, as basis
of the opinion, were admissible as were open to the general
observation of others-friends and relatives.' Some three
days after the will was executed, the testatrix had visited the
office of the cross-examiner, who then represented a neighbor
of the testatrix with whom the latter had some difficulty
over a line fence. The witness, her daughter, was with
testatrix, but remained in the ante-room while her mother
went into the private office of the attorney. The witness
could hear through the transom most of what was being said.
A portion of the testimony follows:
"Q. You believe your mother was of sound mind then?
(Referring to the time of the execution of the will)..
A. I am sure of it.
Q. You would not say she was of sound mind at the
time of her death?
A. No, I could not and would not say that.
Q. Now, this will was executed about two years before
her death, when would you say your mother ceased
to be of sound mind?
A. It was a gradual process. I could not definitely fix
a day, or even a month, when she changed from
sound mind to unsound mind. That would be im-
possible for me to say.
Q. But you do say she was of sound mind at the time
this will was signed?
A. I have no doubt about that.
Q. And a year later?
A. I would not be too sure of that.
Q. Well, six months later?
A. Her age was beginning to tell on her mind then-
slightly at least.
2 Gwinn v. Hobbs, 118 N. E. 155 (Ind. 1917).
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Q. You would not be sure of her mental soundness six
months after she made this will?
A. I would hesitate to express an opinion.
Q. Is there any time, after the execution of the will,
that you would be willing to swear that your mother
was of sound mind?
A. Yes, three days afterwards.
Q. Why? (Fatal of all fatal questions on cross-exami-
nation in such a tight place.)
A. Well, three days afterwards, on the 22nd of April,
she and I went to your office-
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL INTERRUPTING: Your honor,
we object to this witness testifying what may have
occurred at my office three days after the will was
executed. Has nothing to do with any issue in the
case. Besides, may have been a privileged com-
munication. Moreover, not in the presence of
others, a matter not open to the observation of the
public generally.
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL: We have not asked the
question. Counsel has asked for particulars upon
which Miss Laird bases her opinion that her mother
was of sound mind on the 22nd of April. If there
is anything not responsive to the question, I have
not heard it thus far.
THE COURT: It appears to me that the witness, at
the time you interrupted her, was confining her an-
swer to the question, Mr. Roberts (Plaintiff's coun-
sel). If you did not want her to give something
specific, your question should not have been so spe-
cific. You asked her why does she hold such an opin-
ion-a conviction that deceased was of sound mind
some three days after the will was executed. Let
her answer. Objection overruled.
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THE WITNESS: As I commenced to say: Three days
after the will was signed by Mother, she and I went
to your office. She asked you if you were represent-
ing Mrs. Harden, you answered, "yes." She said
Mrs. Harden had told her that you said a fence
which had been erected between her land and ours
was up less than twenty years; she told, you she knew
it was up more than twenty-one years, because Emil
(the plaintiff, who had been partially disinherited
by the will, son of testatrix) had gotten five hundred
dollars from her when the fence was erected, and she
had made a will a few days ago, and had calculated
against him the interest and principal so he would
not get the advantage of the rest of us by her will."
The estate was shown to be worth $4,500.00. There were
five children. Figuring 6 % interest on $500.00 for 21 years
made the amount $1,130.00. This added to the value of
the estate. made $5,630.00, or $1,160.00 for each child. The
will gave to the son Emil $25.00, within five dollars of his
just share if the testatrix' statement, as recited by the wit-
ness was true. There was no other means of proving the
advance by qualified witnesses. The plaintiff was incom-
petent to deny the advahce. The court properly instructed
the jury that they should not take into consideration, as an.
established fact, any recital of conversation or other trans-
action given in evidence by any party to the proceeding, as
such recitals were only admitted as foundations for opinions
of the witnesses as to the soundness or unsoundness of mind
of the testatrix.3 But on inquiry from the jury after a
verdict in defendants' favor sustaining the will, this item of
evidence to the jury, as was to be expected, proved con-
clusively that: (1) testatrix, at the time she made the will,
knew the value and extent of her property; (2) the number
and names of those who were the natural objects of her
3 Gwinn v. Hobbs, op. cit. supra note 2.
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bounty; (3) their deserts with reference to conduct and
treatment towards her, and their capacity and necessity;
and (4) had sufficient active memory to retain all these
facts long enough to have her will prepared and executed;
all in strict conformance with the instruction of the court..
That little cross-query "Why?" undoubtedly settled the
issue.
Another psychological faux pas to which the uninitiate,
and even some hardened practitioners, too frequently are
prone on cross-examination, is that of giving an impression
-intentional or unconsciously-that the cross-examiner dis-
believes the witness and intends to make the witness out a
liar, before anything has occurred in the trial upon which
to base the assumption. The injury accomplished to the
cross-examiner's side of the case from this manoeuvre is fre-
quently incalculable. In the absence of eliciting on that
examination something tangible to sustain the predetermined
theory of falsehood, and if the witness successfully with-
stands the ordeal, it is the cross-examiner, and not the wit-
ness, who emerges with "the hall-mark of Ananias. Intui-
tively the jury, and not unlikely the trial judge, will, in such
circumstances, build up a mental resistance against the sug-
gested inferences and innuendoes cast out by the examiner.
It is not meant to discount the importance of putting to dis-
comfiture an obviously mendacious witness and thereby
emphasize not only his own worthlessness to the side which
called him, but also to bring additional dubiety to the whole
case he seeks to sustain; however, be certain that the triers
of the facts are convinced the witness is intentionally pre-
varicating, before risking this artifice.
Closely allied with the indiscretion last noted, is that of
according over-emphasis to a discrepancy in some incon-
sequential detail of the witness's examination-a slight
variation between statements on direct and cross-examination
4 Hoffbaur v. Morgan, 88 N. E. 337 (Ind. 1909)
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of the witness especially to be expected on estimates, such
as speed, distance, time, value and narration of conversa-
tions. It tries the patience of even a jobal tribunal for
counsel to put question after question to a witness appar-
ently seeking explanation as to why, on direct examination,
the witness said the motor car was going between twenty
and twenty-five miles per hour, when on cross-examination
the testimony is that it was going between eighteen and
twenty-three miles per hour; or on the point that hereto-
fore the witness said the land was plowed two weeks before
the crop was put in, and now says that it was about ten
days. The net advantage usually to be gained by such an
hyperbolic course is exactly nothing, and the risk attend-
ing its pursuit is entirely out of all proportion to the pos-
sible profit. Of course, this criticism is not intended to ap-
ply to those instances where the witness makes a positive
and unqualified statement of a material fact in issue, of con-
trolling importance, without indicating, or it being apparent
that the witness relies on estimate, fallible recollection, or
judgment which is necessarily inexact. Hence, when a wit-
ness undertakes to speak with positiveness that the distance'
was so and so by measurement; that he at the time looked
at his watch or at the speedometer; that it was on Sunday;
etc., etc., and from such.actual observation, or exact knowl-
edge he is presumed to possess, on cross-examination a dis-
cordance is established which the witness admits, then it is
not only proper, but demanded that he be pilloried for the
incongruity.
To the average layman the most inexcusable blundering
of a lawyer in the trial of a cause is his relentless, blustering,
browbeating and bear-baiting of witnesses on cross-examina-
tion. With few exceptions the brow-beater is Euripides'
lion lashing himself with his own tail. He may, and usually
does, cause the witness subjected to the torture, pain, dis-
comfort, embarrassment, and psychic distress, but insofar
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as producing any advantage to his own case, it rarely gets
him anywhere. There are exceptional occasions, confined
almost wholly to criminal cases and matters of domestic
relations, where the cross-examiner confronts a particularly
vicious or brutal type, when such conduct may be called for,
or at least justified; but to appropriate the procedure as a
rule or habit, is bound to bring irremediable loss to one's
clients.
Then we have the unbearable repetitive cross-examiner.
He is blood-kin to the perpetual-motion machine and just
about as impossible. He tries and irritates court, jury and
co-counsel, to say nothing of the witness. Moreover, it is
not unlikely that he may seriously and irretrievably damage
his case in the process, by giving undue emphasis to the ex-
amination in chief. It calls to mind an action for breach
of promise to marry, accompanied by seduction. The plain-
tiff had recited with considerable reluctance some intimacies
with defendant. Only by stretching logic and probability
to their remotest bounds, could it be inferred from plain-
tiff's direct examination that she surrendered herself to the
defendant under the beguiling influence of a promise of
espousal. In all likelihood, had she not been cross-exam-
ined, the court would have taken from the jury the question
of seduction. However, an enterprising youngster pro-
ceeded to take her all over the ground covered by the direct
examination. Amateurishly mistaking her hesitation on the
crucial question in chief and the gingerly handling of that
phase of the inquest by her counsel as evidence of total lack
of a case on this theory, the cross-examiner, prying into
minute detail, to his discomfiture, brought out a clear and
unmistakable case for the plaintiff, and despite the positive
denials of the defendant, the jury found for the plaintiff on
the charge. This example afforded to the blunderer a les-
son he will ever remember, but at what a cost to his client!
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Besides holding in store grave pit-falls for the examiner,
a repetitive cross-examination makes unwarranted draughts
on the time of all concerned in the trial. Apart from any
abuse, cross-examination almost always consumes more time
than* the direct. When, one adds to the time legitimately
occupied with cross-examination, an entire repetition-and
perhaps two and three repetitions-of the direct, tacit and
perhaps expressed censorship is quite likely to ensue.
The ideal cross-examiner has mapped out in his mind,
and usually memorized by charted notes, just what course
he will pursue with the witness before the direct is finished.
He commences and ends with a purpose and definite objec-
tives, whether he achieves them or not. Having failed to
gain his points, and feeling persuaded that they are un-
attainable, he drops the quizzing to avoid injury to his own
case. The average novice is possessed with a feeling of
seasickness when his adversary finally says: "Take the wit-
ness." He has been listening to the witness's recitals with an
attitude about the same as his client's. Taken wholly off
guard, yet resolved to conceal his unreadiness, he discon-
solately glances to the top of his notes and in a confusion
of errors, proceeds with a monotonous retracement of the
path blazed by his opponent. His ideas on what to ask
and how to ask are'a jackdaw's hoard, picked up anyhow
and piled together anywise. Of only one thing does he ap-
pear certain-the witness must be cross-examined!
By no means have we set forth all criticism that would
properly fall under the rubric captioning this article. Others
will be recalled by every experienced trial lawyer. It is
thought that the most flagrant botches are here exposed.
In essaying a remedy, we point to the patient and say:
"Within yourself lies your own cure. Become educated,
not merely instructed. Know the reason for asking, besides
the ability to ask."
Walter R. Arnold.
South Bend, Indiana.
